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Abstract
In this paper, we test the contribution of foreign management on firms’ competi-
tiveness. We use a novel dataset on the careers of 165, 084 managers employed by
13, 106 companies in the United Kingdom in the period 2009-2017. We find that
domestic manufacturing firms become, on average, between 7% and 12% more
productive after hiring the first foreign managers, whereas foreign-owned firms
register no significant improvement. In particular, we test that previous industry-
specific experience is the primary driver of productivity gains in domestic firms
(15.6%), in a way that allows the latter to catch up with foreign-owned firms.
Managers from the European Union are highly valuable, as they represent about
half of the recruits in our data. Our identification strategy combines matching
techniques, difference-in-difference, and pre-recruitment trends to challenge re-
verse causality. Results are robust to placebo tests and to different estimators
of Total Factor Productivity. Eventually, we argue that upcoming limits to the
mobility of foreign talents after the Brexit event can hamper the allocation of
productive managerial resources.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, workers’ mobility has increased dramatically. The percentage
of foreign employment in the United Kingdom has risen from 3.54% to 11.33% in the
period 1997-2019 (ONS, 2019). Indeed, the United Kingdom has been a desirable des-
tination in the last decades, and a boost in immigration rates has been at the core
of the referendum campaign that supported an exit from the European Union. Yet,
there are already about 164 million migrant workers around the world (ILO, 2018), and
according to Baldwin (2016, 2019), we should expect ever-increasing global mobility of
workers in the next stage of the economic globalization as a consequence of new infor-
mation technologies and reduced transportation costs. Crucially, Workers’ international
mobility facilitates a transfer of knowledge among firms (Bahar and Rapoport, 2018),
possibly reducing transaction costs after they bring valuable information on their origin
countries (Gould, 1994; Parsons and Vézina, 2018). Moreover, the diversity brought
by migrant workers can contribute to firms’ relational capital and ability to market
products internationally (Parrotta et al., 2014), while in the long run hosting coun-
tries are better off thanks to greater product variety available in consumption and as
intermediate inputs (di Giovanni et al., 2015).
In this study, we specifically test how firms’ competitiveness is affected by the mo-
bility of a peculiar category of high-skilled workers, the managers, as they are vital
contributors to any firm’s organization. From our point of view, a (domestic or foreign)
manager’s ability to transfer knowledge from previous positions is revealed when she
implements managerial practices1. Yet, previous works have been rather silent on the
relationship between foreign management and productivity, while giving priority to the
impact on export performance (Meinen et al., 2018; Mion et al., 2016; Mion and Opro-
molla, 2014). From our perspective, the nexus between organization and productivity
is of primary order: foreign managers can have an impact (or not) on firms’ productive
capabilities, which in turn may lead (or not) to better export performance. Eventually,
talents from abroad may bring tacit knowledge in a company that is beneficial to a
firm, whatever its strategy on domestic and foreign markets.
We find that the recruitment of first foreign managers has a positive and significant
impact on firm-level productivity when a firm is domestic. In contrast, we detect
1The reference is to seminal works that show how good managerial practices explain differences
in productivities across firms and countries (Bloom et al., 2016, 2014; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010,
2007; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). See more details in Section 2.
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no significant effect on the productivity of foreign-owned firms, possibly because any
knowledge spillovers already occurred after the takeover by a multinational enterprise.
The average productivity gains in domestic firms fall in a range from 7% to 12% after
recruitment. These gains are similar in magnitude to productivity gains detected after
foreign acquisitions, as from previous literature (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik,
2009), and they are mostly due to industry-specific experience gathered in previous
positions (15.6%). In this case, we argue, the possibility to recruit foreign talents
in possession of industry-specific skills allows a domestic company to catch up with
competitors. The productivity gains are particularly evident for managers from the
European Union, who constitute about half of the foreign recruits, and in firms that
locate in urbanized regions, although we can find foreign talents scattered across all
UK regions.
For our purpose, we take advantage of a novel dataset that matches the individual
careers of 165,084 managers and the financial accounts of 13,106 firms in the United
Kingdom in the period 2009-2017. From our point of view, the UK is a compelling
case study of a country that is revising migration policies after exiting from the Euro-
pean Union. We assess firms’ competitiveness by estimating Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) à la Ackerberg et al. (2015), and we make our findings robust to alternative
methods by Wooldridge (2009) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Our identification
strategy encompasses difference-in-difference estimates controlling for pre-recruitment
trends after the implementation of a propensity score matching that pairs treated firms
with nearest untreated neighbors along with different firm-level characteristics (Abadie
and Imbens, 2006; Imbens et al., 2004; Rubin, 2001). In the empirical setup, we build on
the experience of previous scholars that tested productivity gains in relationship with
foreign ownership (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Javorcik and Poelhekke,
2017). Besides, we further challenge our results to make sure that they are robust
to regional confounding factors that favor the endogenous local matching of firms and
foreign workers (Orefice and Peri, 2020; Dauth et al., 2018).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our frame-
work by nesting in previous literature. Section 3 describes the data set and draws
attention to preliminary evidence. Section 4 introduces results on the relationship be-
tween foreign management, market experience, and firms’ competitiveness. Section 5
discusses sensitivity and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature review
The fundamental idea that the quality of management correlates with a productive
usage of inputs is an old one that we can date back to Walker (1887), although thor-
ough empirical studies had to wait for good microdata on managers and managerial
practices (Syverson, 2011). Eventually, a fruitful strand of research emerged to high-
light how productivity differences across both firms and countries can be explained by
the adoption of different managerial practices (Bloom et al., 2019; Bruhn et al., 2018;
Bloom et al., 2016, 2012; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010, 2007; Bertrand and Schoar,
2003). A recent study by Giorcelli (2019) shows that specific management training can
have a long-lasting impact on firms’ performances, up to fifteen years after the end of
the program.
We relate in part to the above strand of research when we look at the role of for-
eign managerial talents because we assume that the main channel through which any
(domestic or foreign) manager can have an impact on the performance of a company
is by setting good managerial practices. However, our primary intuition is that foreign
managers shall also be considered on a par with other high-skilled migrants like en-
gineers, researchers, and other professionals (Nathan, 2014) because their occupation
often requires a combination of advanced training and soft skills. Since migrant workers
increase the TFP of firms in a region or a country (Beerli et al., 2018; Mitaritonna et al.,
2017), we reasonably expect that foreign managers have no lesser impact given their
crucial role in any firm’s organization. In a general equilibrium model, Fadinger and
Mayr (2014) show how a relative increase in the endowment of skilled migrants reduces
the relative unemployment rate and the relative emigration rate (brain drain) of skilled
workers in a country, with a magnitude depending on the elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers as well as on the well functioning of the matching on
labor markets. In the end, the international geography of skills can have aggregate and
distributional impacts with significant consequences from an international perspective
(Burzynski et al., 2020).
From our viewpoint, the study of the relationship between the recruitment of foreign
managers and productivity is of primary importance, and it should logically precede
the one with export performance (Meinen et al., 2018; Mion et al., 2016; Mion and
Opromolla, 2014) or with foreign direct investment Cho (2018); Santacreu-Vasut and
Teshima (2016); Golob-Sustersic and Zajc-Kejzar (2020). Recruited talents can bring
tacit knowledge from abroad that can be beneficial to firms (Giannetti et al., 2015),
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whatever their internationalization strategies. Thus, a company can benefit (or not)
from changes in managerial practices implemented by recruits, first improve compet-
itiveness, and then propose better on international markets. The latter is the stand
we take in this contribution, and we believe this is in line with seminal efforts to pre-
dict self-selection of productive firms into exports and foreign investment (Melitz, 2003;
Helpman et al., 2004; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Conconi et al., 2016). Yet, our stand
is not in contradiction with the possibility that foreign managers help reducing trans-
action costs (Gould, 1994; Parsons and Vézina, 2018), therefore fostering exports with
their native countries. In this case, as well, we expect first to observe an improvement
in the competitiveness of firms, as a result of lower trade costs, and then a boost in
either imports or exports, as demonstrated in the case of foreign workers in UK services
firms by Ottaviano et al. (2018).
Interestingly, in our contribution, we do find that the recruitment of first foreign
managers has a significant impact on the productivity of domestic firms, thanks in
particular to previous industry experience. On the contrary, we do not find any signif-
icant gains in foreign-owned firms, possibly due to a previous alignment of managerial
practices with foreign headquarters at the moment of the takeover.
In part, we build our identification strategy on the experience of previous scholars
that detected spillovers after foreign acquisitions (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik,
2009). Besides, we care about controlling for the heterogeneous attractivity of some
regions, as this is yet another possible confounding element once we acknowledge that
most productive firms locate in denser and urban regions (Combes et al., 2012). Against
previous evidence, we recognize that supply-driven changes in the endowments of immi-
grant workers can increase local benefits from assortative matching (Orefice and Peri,
2020; Dauth et al., 2018), hence having an indirect impact on firm-level productivities.
Eventually, we provide evidence that domestic manufacturing firms with foreign
managers in their team are not significantly different in productivity from foreign-
owned firms with or without foreign managers. We believe that the recruitment of
talents from abroad is a strategy that allows domestic firms to catch-up with foreign
competitors. Although it is not the scope of this work to investigate the latter direction
of causality, we believe that the international composition of the workforce is a further
dimension that deserves more room by scholars interested in the global outreach of
firms, for example, in Bernard et al. (2018).
Finally, we want to relate our work to literature that explores the impact of the
Brexit event (Ortiz Valverde and Latorre, 2020; Cappariello et al., 2020; Dhingra et al.,
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2017), as our results seem to imply that any upcoming limit to the international mobility
of talents could depress productivity of domestic firms, on top of expected losses from
new frictions in international markets for inputs and outputs.
3 Data and preliminary evidence
3.1 Managers and firms
We source data on careers of managers and firms’ financial accounts in the United
Kingdom from Orbis, a commercial database compiled by the Bureau Van Dijk2, which
is a consultancy firm controlled by Moody’s Analytics. The database collects origi-
nal information on management based on individual companies’ filings, including their
roles, dates of recruitment, nationality, gender, and age. Unfortunately, only scant
information is present about managers’ education and wages. For our purpose, we se-
lect managers working at least one year for manufacturing firms active in the United
Kingdom in the period 2009-2017.
Interestingly, the UK has good coverage of management information thanks to spe-
cific filing requirements asked by compilers of the UK national registry, the Companies
House, following the Companies Act in 20063.
In this context, we consider a manager as any individual that participates in a
company’s board, committee, or executive department. Therefore, we exclude from our
analysis advisors and shareholders as they do not participate in the daily administration
of the company. We end up with a sample of 165,084 managers working for 13,106
manufacturing companies located in the United Kingdom. Please note, however, that
any manager in our sample can cover more than one role in the same company, or she
can participate in the management of more than one company at the same time. Since
we have recruitment dates differentiated by both role and company for each manager,
we can follow a manager’s career within and across companies. In Appendix Table
A1, we present some details on managers’ levels of responsibility as included in our
2The Orbis database collects and standardizes firms’ financial statements from around the globe.
Orbis data are increasingly used for firm-level studies on multinational enterprises, see for example
Alviarez et al. (2017), Cravino and Levchenko (2016), and Del Prete and Rungi (2017).
3In particular, the primary legal concern is that a company cannot appoint managers that are
undischarged bankrupts or that were previously disqualified by the court from acting as company
directors. In recent past, risk and compliance companies systematically scrutinized the ensemble of
directors from the Companies House registry to unearth how many were included on international
watchlists of individuals considered at high risk of crime. See, for example, O’Neill (2008)
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sample. In the following analyses, we consider the date of recruitment the earliest date
a manager covered any role in that company. In the end, the nationality of managers
is a crucial variable in our analysis. In our sample, we find that 16.43 % of managers
have a foreign nationality.
Table 1: Top 10 nationalities of foreign managers
Nationality No. of managers
United States 7,557
Germany 3,160
Japan 2,751
France 2,383
Ireland 1,425
Netherlands 1,273
Italy 1,068
Sweden 996
South Africa 941
Denmark 782
Others 7,439
Total 29,775
Note: A foreign manager is a manager with a nationality different from UK. In case of multiple
nationalities, including UK, the individual is considered a domestic manager.
Table 1 presents the top 10 most common nationalities we detect in our sample.
Please note how we adopt here a conservative definition of a foreign manager. For
instance, a manager that has dual citizenship, including the UK’s, is still considered
domestic. In this case, we want to exclude as much as possible from the set of foreign
managers individuals that are UK citizens raised by foreign individuals that migrated
relatively earlier in their age. As largely expected, managers landing in UK companies
come from around the globe. We find in our sample 27,117 foreign managers with 114
different foreign nationalities. Out of them, 2,260 are citizens with multiple passports
different from UK’s. The most represented country is the US, followed by Germany,
Japan, and France. Overall, we find that 48.26% of foreign managers are citizens of the
European Union, and they represent about 7.93% of the total managers.
In Figure 1, we report the geographic coverage of our sample. On the first map, we
show the total number of firms (in logs) by NUTS 3-digit regions, and on a second map,
we represent only the subset of firms that have at least one foreign manager in their
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team. Prima facie, we do not observe any specific patterns of geographic selection in our
data, as we can spot foreign teams of managers on the entire UK territory4. In general,
most populated regions are also denser in terms of manufacturing activities, with the
exclusion of the city of London, where we expect a specialization in services. In the
last year of our sample, about 13.5% of companies with foreign managers located in the
greater London area, where the share of foreign managers on the total is 13.9%. In the
end, we observe how the recruitment of talents from abroad seems to be a widespread
practice of many firms across all UK regions.
Figure 1: Geographic coverage
Note: The total number of firms (on the left) and the number of firms with foreign managers (on
the right) are reported in logarithmic scale by NUTS 3-digit regions.
When we focus only on firms with foreign managers, in Table 2, we separate the
ones that hired for the first time a foreign manager from the total. As expected, it is
more common for foreign companies to have foreign teams, either because they interact
4Please note the peculiar case of firms that hire Irish managers in Northern Ireland. In the following
analyses, we will exclude them from the perimeter of firms that hire foreign managers. We believe that
in many cases we face commuters that travel daily across the Irish border. In this case, we presume
that common historical roots prevail on the possession of different passports.
8
more often with international markets or because management is selected by foreign
headquarters. In either case, a large share of both domestic-owned (72%) and foreign-
owned firms (86%) did hire at least one foreign manager in our period of analysis.
Table 2: Firms with foreign managers and new foreign hires in 2009-2017
One or more foreign managers One or more foreign recruits Percentage
All firms 4,607 3,804 82.57 %
of which:
Domestic firms 1,150 826 71.83%
Foreign subsidiaries 3,457 2,978 86.14%
Note: The table presents the number of firms with foreign managers (column 1), as well as the
number of firms that recruited for the first time a foreign manager in 2009-2017 (columns 2),
expressed as a percentage (column 3).
For the sake of completeness, in Appendix Table A2, we show the top 10 origin
countries of foreign-owned firms. The identification of foreign-owned companies follows
international standards (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2009, 2016), according to which a
subsidiary is controlled after a (direct or indirect) concentration of voting rights (>50%).
We observe that a majority of foreign-owned subsidiaries (1,321) is controlled by US
parent companies, whereas the second origin country is Germany (394), followed by
Japan (279) and France (262). If we cumulate foreign subsidiaries held by parent
companies located in EU members, we find they represent that the latter represent
40.1% (1,663) of the total number of foreign subsidiaries (4,150).
3.2 Productivity, foreign managers, and ownership
For our baseline analyses, we estimate firm-level total factor productivities (TFPs) fol-
lowing the technique by Ackerberg et al. (2015). TFP is traditionally interpreted as the
portion of output growth not explained by growth in observed inputs. The major iden-
tification problem in estimating a firm-level production function is that input choices
can depend on shocks unobserved by the econometrician at the end of the period, when
firms’ financial accounts typically become available. Therefore, an endogeneity problem
can arise such that the observed combination of production factors is simultaneous to
the possibly unobserved shocks, hence OLS estimates are inconsistent. In this context,
Ackerberg et al. (2015) improve on previous efforts by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
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and Wooldridge (2009), which we however take as alternative estimators for robustness
checks. To estimate TFPs, we source data on operating revenues, materials, number of
employees, and fixed assets. We further control for firm age and entry-exit dynamics.
All variables are properly deflated using producer price indices that are specific for each
2-digit manufacturing industry.
Therefore, at this stage, we can present preliminary evidence extracted from a se-
quence of least-squares binary regressions that catch the correlations between the pres-
ence of foreign managers in a team and the productivity of the firm, in the form:
yijt = β0 + β1Di + β2Xit + γj + δt + εijt (1)
where yijt is the (log of) TFP of a firm i active in a sector j at time t. Di is a
dummy that identifies the presence of at least one foreign manager in a team without
regard to her tenure in the firm. A set Xit of firm-level regressors (size, age, capital
intensity, the share of managers on total employees, and wage bill), industry (γj), and
year (δt) fixed effects are included. Only point estimates of the coefficients of interest
on Di are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Productivity premia, foreign managers, and ownership
TFP premia N. obs.
Firms with vs. without foreign managers 0.045**(0.020) 51,900
Domestic-owned with vs. without foreign managers 0.045* (0.023) 31,874
Foreign-owned with vs. without foreign managers 0.003 (0.019) 20,026
Foreign- vs. domestic-owned with foreign managers 0.021 (0.022) 23,801
Foreign- vs. domestic-owned firms 0.054**(0.019) 51,900
Note: TFP premia are estimated after OLS binary regressions where the dependent variable is the
(log of) TFP, including firm-level controls (size, age, capital intensity, average wage bill, the share
of managers over total employees), industry and year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by 2-digit
industries in parentheses. * and ** stand for p < 0.1 and p < 0.05, respectively.
As largely expected, foreign firms are, on average, more productive than domestic
firms. More interesting, we detect a slightly smaller TFP premium for firms that
have a foreign manager in their team. The latter is a novelty of our study. The
advantage is particularly evident in the case of domestic firms. Even more interestingly,
10
we do not find a significant difference in competitiveness when we compare domestic
firms with foreign managers and foreign firms. Preliminary results from Table 3 are
corroborated from t-tests performed in Appendix Table A3. Evidently, the presence of
foreign managers in a team correlates, on average, with a higher productivity.
Previous preliminary evidence motivates our following analyses, where we will ex-
plicitly challenge the hypothesis that foreign managers can transfer knowledge to a
domestic firm in the form of generic or specific skills in production and, thus, allow
them to catch up with foreign or domestic competitors. To this end, we want to rule
out any phenomenon of cherry-picking, such that more productive firms are also the
ones that are more likely to hire better talents and pay their expensive bills.
4 Empirical strategy and results
We assess the impact of hiring foreign managers on the productivity of a firm through
a quasi-experiment. We consider firms as treated when they recruited for the first
time a foreign manager in the period 2009-2017. Thus, we can track down the impact
on productivity thanks to financial accounts while controlling for confounders that
can determine the preference of a manager to accept a position in a specific firm and
change her career for the better. In Section 4.1, we perform an exercise to check the
average treatment effects on treated firms (ATT). In Section 4.2, we identify a control
group made of firms that never hired any foreign managers with a propensity score
matching, to check the average treatment effects (ATE). In this case, we challenge our
identification strategy to simulate a counterfactual with firms that are otherwise similar
along with all the characteristics that make them an attractive destination for a new
(domestic or foreign) talented worker, including also their observed productivity.
In Section 4.3, we test that the knowledge passed to the new firm is industry-specific,
as the foreign managers that had experience in the same sector are also the ones that
are better able to drive a positive impact on the productivity of domestic firms.
Finally, we explicitly test whether there is a specific geographic pattern of talent
selection in Section 4.4, and we find that productivity gains are particularly evident
after recruiting European managers, and in firms that locate in urban areas.
Please, note how we make sure throughout our analyses that multiple hirings in a
sequence do not interfere with each other in determining potential outcomes. As a solu-
tion, we drop from our sample the firm-per -year observations regarding any recruitment
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following the first. For example, if a firm hired for the first time one foreign manager
in 2010, and then it hires another foreign manager, say, in 2014, then we keep only the
information related to the period from 2009 to 2013.
4.1 Difference-in-difference on treated firms
We start by estimating the following diff-in-diff equation on the group of companies
that hired their first foreign managers in our period of analysis:
tfpijrt = β0 + β1Tijr × Postt + β2Xijrt + γj + δt + ζr +
∑
k
ηk × δt + εijrt (2)
where the dependent variable tfpijrt is the (log of) TFP for a firm i active in a sector
j and region r at time t. Tijr is the treatment, i.e., it indicates that a firm recruited the
first foreign manager, whereas Postt is a binary variable equal to one for observations
following the recruitment. Since, at this stage, we focus exclusively on the group of firms
that hired first foreign managers, (1−eβ1) is our main quantity of interest and it catches
the average treatment effect on treated firms (ATT) expressed in percentage units. Xijrt
includes firm-level controls (size, age, capital intensity, wage bill, the ratio of managers
over employees, foreign ownership) and regional characteristics (employment density
defined as the share of NUTS-2 regional employment). Additionally, we include γj, δt
and ζr as 2-digit industry, year, and NUTS-3 regional fixed effects, respectively. At this
stage, we are already able to include a control for self-selection of talented managers
into better companies. In fact, we argue, foreign managers may prefer working for
companies based on some features that are unobserved to us. As a solution, we include
the term
∑
k ηk×δt, which represents a full set of pre-recruitment features (age, size and
4-digit industry) interacted with a time trend δt. In the latter term, we categorize firm
age in the following way: [0, 4], [5, 9], [10, 14], and 15+ years. On the other hand, we
categorize firm size according to the number of employees in the following way: [0, 9],
[10, 19], [20, 49], [50, 249], and 250+ employees. For a similar solution, see also Bircan
(2019). The same exercise is repeated first for all firms, then for both domestic and
foreign-owned firms, separately.
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Table 4: TFP and foreign managers - Average Treatment in the Treated (ATT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .013 .016 .013 .012 .004
(.027) (.023) (.024) (.023) (.021)
R2 .923 .933 .935 .940 .950
No. of obs. 5,046 5,046 5,046 3,670 3,670
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .084* .089*** .075** .104** .023
(.043) (.031) (.035) (.042) (.050)
R2 0.914 .935 .940 .924 .946
No. of obs. 1,874 1,874 1,874 1,472 1,472
Panel C: Foreign firms
Hired× Post-recruitment -.033 -.035 -.044* -.038 -.035*
(.029) (.023) (.023) (.030) (.019)
R2 .936 .951 .954 .964 .973
No. of obs. 3,172 3,172 3,172 2,198 2,198
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
4-digit Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the average treatment effects on the treated firms (ATT) after controlling
for confounders, as from Eq. (2). Coefficients are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit
industries in parentheses. Controls include firm size, firm age, capital intensity, average wage bill,
the share of managers on total employees, regional employment density and, for Panel A, foreign
subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
In columns 1-4 of Table 4, we find a significant increase in TFP for domestic firms
ranging in an interval from 7.79% to 10.96% (log units: from 0.075 to 0.104) after
they hire the first foreign managers. Yet, the coefficient is not significant anymore
after we introduce region fixed effects. Evidently, the results on previous columns can
be determined by some confounders at the region level. Indeed, there is an entire
line of research that studies the comparative advantage of larger cities (Combes et al.,
2012), where high-quality workers match with high-quality firms (Orefice and Peri,
2020; Dauth et al., 2018). For this reason, in the next Section 4.2, we will explicitly
control for the endogenous self-selection into locations after we implement a propensity
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score matching. Firms that locate in prosperous and industrious regions can benefit
from local agglomeration economies, increase their productivity and, thence, attract
the best talents5.
Please also note how we can spot a negative albeit weakly significant coefficient in
column 3 and 5 of Table 4. As far as we know, there is no record of similar findings in
previous literature. We guess that foreign headquarters can send managers that solve
some monitoring issues when a firm is in trouble. Our pre-recruitment trends and firm
controls catch at least part of this additional source of self-selection of managers based
on previous performances. We will not say more in the following analyses on this, as
this negative correlation disappears after we introduce a more challenging identification
strategy.
4.2 Diff-in-diff after propensity-score matching
In this Section, we implement a strategy that more explicitly challenges the direction of
causality. We want to exclude that positive correlations between productivity premia
and foreign managers can be explained by the ability of some firms in some locations
to pick more promising talents onto international job markets. For this purpose, we
apply a matching procedure to select a control group made of firms that mirror the
characteristics of firms that hired first foreign managers. Picking from the group of
firms that never hired any foreign managers, we run a one-to-one nearest neighbor
matching algorithm (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Imbens et al., 2004; Rubin, 2001) that
searches first within any 2-digit industry-per -year cell in which we find treated firms, to
make sure that differences in performance coming from different market conditions do
not exert influence on our estimated effects. All time-variant explanatory variables are
lagged one year to reflect pre-treatment performances. We choose a set of explanatory
variables by following previous literature that studied the impact of foreign ownership
(Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Javorcik and Poelhekke, 2017). In fact,
we assume that the recruitment of foreign managers is endogenous to a similar set
of observable firms’ characteristics that make a company desirable as a target by a
foreign company, including technology, firm age, firm size, the average composition
of employment, capital intensity. In addition, we include three specific controls that
5Please note, however, that we do not find any peculiar pattern of selection of foreign managers on
the UK territory in Figure 1. Firms in every NUTS 3-digit region hire foreign managers. Still, we can
think of a selection based on skills, as we presume that high-skilled individuals are also the ones in a
position to choose where to work and live.
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can make a new position in a company desirable for talented newcomers: the share
of managers on total employees, as a proxy for the skill composition of the workforce,
the total number of managers, and the regional employment density of firms’ locations
as a proxy for local agglomeration economies. The latter is particularly useful since
we acknowledge that local assortative matching between workers and firms exert an
indirect impact on firm-level productivity (Orefice and Peri, 2020; Dauth et al., 2018).
Table 5: Probit estimates from propensity score matching
Dep variable: Hire=1
TFPt−1 .0034 Capital intensityt−1 .0145***
(.0041) (.0046)
TFPt−1× Aget−1 -.0003 Capital intensityt−1 × Aget−1 -.0015***
(.0005) (.0005)
Sizet−1 -.0187*** Skill intensityt−1 .0023
(.0054) (.0033)
Sizet−1× Aget−1 .0025*** Managers t−1 .0086
(.0006) (.0067)
Average waget−1 -.0044 Managers 2t−1 -.0026
(.0125) (.0024)
Average waget−1× Aget−1 .0009 Foreign ownership .1617***
(.0015) (.0096)
Aget−1 .0048 Employment densityt−1 .2045***
(.0095) (.0596)
Age2t−1 -.0008*
(.0005)
Pseudo R2 0.228
No. of obs. 20,866
Note: The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the mean after a probit model. The de-
pendent variable is equal to one if firms recruited first foreign managers. All variables are in logs
except skill intensity, regional employment density and foreign subsidiary status. Errors are clus-
tered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively.
Table 5 presents the results of the first-stage probit model. Interestingly, lagged
TFP per se does not correlate with the recruitment of first foreign managers. On
the other hand, in line with expectations, results indicate that relatively smaller and
capital-intensive firms are more likely to hire a foreign manager. Moreover, in line with
descriptive statistics, foreign managers preferably work for foreign-owned subsidiaries,
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and they are more likely hired by firms that locate in economically active regions, where
we expect some agglomeration economies.
Table 6: Balancing test on the nearest-neighbour matching procedure
Variable Sample Average treated Average untreated % Bias t-test p-value Ve(T )/Ve(C)
TFPt−1 Unmatched 2.5842 2.4304 9.2 2.15 0.032 0.92
Matched 2.5935 2.5246 4.1 0.67 0.506 1.11
Sizet−1 Unmatched 4.4521 3.8967 40.9 9.74 0.000 1.28
Matched 4.6226 4.7047 -6.0 -1.06 0.289 0.85
Average wagest−1 Unmatched 5.8326 5.6919 29.3 6.41 0.000 1.02
Matched 5.8380 5.8199 3.8 0.70 0.486 1.06
Aget−1 Unmatched 8.5029 8.6948 -15.9 -5.47 0.000 1.30
Matched 8.8760 8.9705 -7.8 -1.50 0.133 1.04
Managers t−1 Unmatched 1.3404 1.2168 24.3 7.31 0.000 0.96
Matched 1.4530 1.4977 -8.8 -1.49 0.137 0.90
Capital intensityt−1 Unmatched 5.2869 4.9044 26.3 6.08 0.000 0.92
Matched 5.2839 5.2073 5.3 0.90 0.370 0.96
Skill intensityt−1 Unmatched .12497 .12195 0.9 0.22 0.822 1.15
Matched .08019 .08023 -0.0 -0.00 0.997 0.80
Employment densityt−1 Unmatched 03178 .03023 12.3 4.71 0.000 1.26
Matched .03094 .03103 -0.7 -0.11 0.914 1.01
Foreign subsidiary Unmatched .65764 .07762 150.5 77.74 0.000 1.56
Matched .62288 .58898 8.8 1.07 0.287 0.98
Note: The table reports sample averages and t-tests for the original unmatched sample and after
the application of a nearest-neighbor matching technique. See Rubin (2001), Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983), and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for more details.
We evaluate the quality of the matching procedure by implementing a balancing
test in Table 6, where we compare the sample averages of all covariates of both the
treatment and the control groups. Eventually, we find that there is no ex-post statisti-
cally significant difference along the set of variables that we included for the matching,
because null hypotheses of equal mean are always rejected in the matched sample.
In the last column, we report the variance ratio, Ve(T )/Ve(C), of the residuals of
the covariates of the treated over the control group. Following Rubin (2001), a perfect
match implies a ratio equal to one, whereas a ratio between 0.5 and 2 indicates an
acceptable quality. In our case, we do have many variance ratios that fall in a range
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close to one. Moreover, the standardized biases we report in column 5 of Table 6 are less
than 10% in absolute value for all variables after matching. Additionally, in Appendix
Figure A1 we compare the regional coverage of both British and foreign managers in the
matched sample vis á vis the entire sample. Indeed, the possibly endogenous selection
of foreign managers into locations is something that we want to control in following
analyses. We find that the matching procedure works well also along this dimension.
Having ensured that there is a good match among 472 pairs of observations, we
proceed with diff-in-diff estimates proposed in Eq.(2), and we report nested results in
Table 7.
Table 7: TFP and foreign managers - Average Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .042* .039* .040* .042* .039
(.024) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.023)
R2 .938 .949 .951 .940 .951
No. of obs. 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .112*** .070** .069** .110*** .073*
(.027) (.032) (.033) (.028) (.036)
R2 .925 .949 .951 .928 .952
No. of obs. 2,720 2,720 2,720 2,720 2,720
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment -.005 -.024 -.026 -.006 -.027
(.034) (.022) (.023) (.034) (.024)
R2 .955 .966 .967 .958 .967
No. of obs. 2,943 2,943 2,943 2,943 2,943
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq.(2) for the matched sample. Errors are clustered by 2-digit
industries in parentheses. Coefficients in log units. Firm-level controls include age, employment,
capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment density and, for Panel A,
foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Interestingly, the TFP premia on domestic firms have become slightly higher after we
implement the matching procedure, and always positive and significant if we compare
with Table 4. Our baseline results are on the last row, where we report the most
challenging specification, complete with firm controls, region effects, industry-per -year
fixed effects, and a term that catches possible trends making a firm desirable as a
successful destination to pursue a career. In this case, the TFP premium is on average
7.6% (log units 0.073, e0.073 = 1.0757).
In addition, we now find that there is no statistical significance between the foreign
subsidiaries that hired foreign managers and the ones that did not. In fact, we can guess
that primary TFP gains can already occur at the moment a firm is acquired, thanks to
the exchange of knowledge with foreign headquarters, when managerial practices have
been possibly aligned. In this case, there is no reason to wait for an emissary from
the parent company. Unless there were some underlying conditions that require better
monitoring. The latter is the reason that can explain why we find a negative albeit
weakly significant premium when we tested on treated firms only in Table 4.
4.3 The role of industry experience
In general, there are many potential skills that high-skilled migrant workers can provide
to boost productivity when in a new team. They can teach to native workers what the
latter could otherwise find difficult to learn by themselves (Markusen and Trofimenko,
2009), or they can bring skills that help reducing transaction costs once they bring
valuable information on their native countries (Gould, 1994; Parsons and Vézina, 2018).
On the other hand, the diversity brought by migrant workers can contribute to firms’
relational capital and their ability to market products internationally (Parrotta et al.,
2014).
In the specific case of foreign managers, we support the idea that (domestic and
foreign) managers can intervene with their skills to change managerial practices, as in
the framework we sketched from previous literature in Section 2. The tacit knowledge
they bring in the new company is usefully transferred into the implementation of better
managerial processes. Unfortunately, we cannot track whether managerial practices
changed after recruitment. Neither we have much to tell about the intangible skills of
newly-hired manager from our data. What we can do is to infer from previous careers
of managers, as we have information on where individuals worked before taking the
latest position.
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In this Section, we explicitly challenge the hypothesis that previous work experience
can explain the productivity gains observed in previous paragraphs. For this purpose,
we repeat the baseline exercise of Eq.(2), this time considering a more complex treat-
ment. We consider the recruitment of first foreign managers that had: i) a specific
industry experience, because they previously worked in the same industry of the cur-
rent firm; ii) more general experience in any industry different from the one of the
current firm; iii) no experience abroad, because the foreign manager did not work in a
foreign country before the new position.
As in previous paragraphs, the control group still includes firms with no foreign
recruits in our period of analysis, which have been selected following the matching
procedure described in Section 4.2. We report results in Table 8.
Table 8: TFP, foreign managers, and industry experience - Average Treatment Effects
All Domestic Foreign
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Foreign Experience× Same Industry× Post .039 .145** -.013
(.030) (.056) (.037)
Foreign Experience×Other Industry× Post .058 .170 -.052*
(.050) (.125) (.026)
No Foreign Experience× Post .025 .007 -.018
(.022) (.027) (.036)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates on a matched sample when the treatment is split considering
companies that recruited foreign managers with and without specific industry experience vis á vis
firms that recruited foreign managers with no previous experience, and firms that did not recruit
any foreign manager. Coefficients are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in
parentheses. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill
intensity, regional employment density and, for the first column, the foreign subsidiary status. *,
** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
Interestingly, the TFP gains in domestic firms are mainly explained by specific
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industry experience, and the coefficient is much higher than previous estimates (15.6%;
log units: 0.145). In the case of foreign-owned firms, we still find no significant impact
on productivity after the recruitment of foreign managers.
In the case of domestic firms, we argue, we are better able to catch the nature
of the knowledge that is passed to the firm. Previous experience in the same indus-
try entails an on-field training on management and production processes that may be
particularly useful to the new firm. Interestingly, these results can be related to ear-
lier works that correlate the recruitment of foreign managers with an improvement in
export performance (Mion and Opromolla, 2014; Mion et al., 2016), which was espe-
cially relevant in the case of market-specific experience. Unfortunately, we can neither
confirm nor exclude that newly recruited foreign managers permit firms to gain better
access to international markets by reducing transaction costs, as theorized for all cat-
egories of workers by Bahar and Rapoport (2018). However, as argued in Section 2,
we believe that the relationship between organization and productivity is of primary
importance, and it should logically precede the study of internationalization strategies.
Firms first improve competitiveness, for example, by reducing trade costs, and then
they can propose on foreign markets. Taken from a more general point of view, any
aggregate improvement of productivity is welfare-enhancing, and, as such, it should be
considered by policymakers of primary importance. In contrast, increases in export
performances are not welfare-enhancing per se if they do not lead to better usage of
productive resources.
4.4 Geographic patterns
In Section 3, we showed two important stylized facts from our sample based on the
geography of foreign managers and firms that recruit them. Altogether, citizens from
the European Union account for 48.3% of the total number of foreign managers. Firms
hiring foreign managers are distributed throughout the UK territory, apparently with
no specific pattern of concentration if compared with the full sample. In this Section,
we will explicitly test: i) whether the passport of the manager has an impact on the
productivity of a firm, ii) and whether firms in urbanized vis á vis rural regions benefit
in different ways from foreign managers.
In Table 9, we test the same specification of Eq.(2), this time separating firms that
recruited for the first time EU foreign managers from the rest, then checking if they had
previous experience in any country within the European Union or not. In Appendix
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Table A4 and Table A5, we repeat the same exercise separating firms recruiting from
the US and from countries belonging to the Commonwealth.
Table 9: TFP and EU Managers - Average Treatment Effects
All Domestic Foreign
Panel A: EU passports
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Hired EU× Post .066** .093* -.001
(.027) (.053) (.022)
Hired non-EU× Post -.004 .031 -.062
(.037) (.070) (.039)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Panel B: EU passports and EU experience
Hired EU× EU Experience× Post .061** .100* .012
(.026) (.054) (.026)
Hired EU× No EU Experience× Post .074 .088 -.056
(.053) (.085) (.068)
Hired non-EU× Post -.004 .031 -.063
(.037) (.070) (.040)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
4-digit Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel A reports estimates of Eq. (2) after the treatment is split considering companies
that recruited a first manager from the EU or not. In Panel B the treatment is split considering
companies recruiting European managers with experience within the EU or not. Coefficients are
in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level controls include
age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment density
and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p <
0.01, respectively.
Notably, a positive and significant coefficient is detected for all firms, and especially
the subset of domestic firms, both when we control for the EU origin of the managers,
and then when we check for previous experience in an EU country. The significance is
weaker in the case of domestic firms if compared to prior results in Tables 7, mainly 8
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because we cannot exclude that managers from other countries are equally beneficial to
the productivity of recruiting firms. No significance is detected when we consider firms
recruiting from US or from the Commonwealth in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. Since
almost half of the companies hired at least one EU manager in our sample, previous
results are driven also, but not exclusively, from EU recruits. The coefficient of interest
is catching a good part of the impact of foreign managers. In this case, we argue that it
is essential to highlight how intra-EU mobility has a positive impact on the productivity
of domestic firms, and upcoming limitations after the Brexit event can threaten also
future productivity gains.
Table 10: TFP, foreign managers, and urbanized regions
Dep. variable: (log) TFP All All Domestic Domestic Foreign Foreign
Panel A: Urbanized regions
Hired× Post .026 .025 .073** .078** -.011 -.011
(.022) (.022) (.030) (.029) (.034) (.031)
R2 .941 .941 .927 .927 .959 .960
No. of obs. 4,034 4,034 1,888 1,888 2,146 2,146
Panel B: Non-urbanized regions
Hired× Post .031 .022 .105 .117 -.026 -.033
(.060) (.059) (.090) (.100) (.076) (.068)
R2 .953 .954 .954 .956 .969 .970
No. of obs. 1,629 1,629 832 832 797 797
Panels A and B:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq.(2) on the matched sample when we separate firms
in urbanized (Panel A) and non-urbanized (Panel B) regions. We do not include region fixed
effects. Coefficients are in log units. Errors in parentheses are clustered by 2-digit industries in
parentheses. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill
intensity, regional employment density and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and ***
stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
In Table 10, we separate urban regions based on Eurostat6, hence dropping region
fixed effects from our baseline specification. As widely expected, we find that produc-
tivity gains in urbanized regions are more evident, in line with the hypothesis that
6Eurostat classifies NUTS 3 regions as predominantly urban (PU) if the share of population living
in local administrative units (LAU2) is below 15%. In the UK, a majority of 112 out of 168 regions
are classified as predominantly urban, i.e., about two regions out of three.
22
local assortative matching has an indirect influence on firm-level productivity, when
more talented managers meet better firms. Please note that we are on purpose not
ruling out all local endogeneity, because we drop region fixed effects from the baseline
specification. In part, we take care of agglomeration economies when we implement the
propensity score matching technique (Table 5). Yet, we believe it is important to high-
light these results precisely because they provide an idea of the geographic endogenous
impact of foreign managers.
5 Sensitivity and robustness checks
In this Section, we introduce four main checks on the robustness and sensitivity of
our results. Our first concern is that our findings are not driven by a specific TFP
methodology. In Table 11, we report results after following three alternatives from
related literature: i)the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm was the first to propose
intermediate inputs in a two-stage procedure that proxies unobserved shocks possibly
introducing a simultaneity bias due to unobserved adjustments in the combination of
factors of production; ii) Wooldridge (2009) proposed to solve the same simultaneity bias
by implementing a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure; iii) Ackerberg
et al. (2015) propose another variant of our baseline, where we switch from a Cobb-
Douglas to a trans-logarithmic production equation to catch different functional forms.
Our main tenets are robust across different TFP methodologies: domestic firms gain
from hiring foreign managers, while foreign-owned firms do not. Please note how the
impact on domestic firms is, respectively, smaller in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
bigger in Wooldridge (2009) than in baseline estimates of Table 8. The reason is that
underlying TFP distributions have different dispersions.
In a second check, our concern is that our findings do not just catch productivity
gains by firms that are more active in labor markets, whatever the origin and the
previous position of the managers. As we can assume that higher managerial mobility
in the UK allows some proactive firms to a faster reallocation of productive resources,
we challenge our findings by proposing a specific placebo test in Table 12. In this case,
we treat firms with domestic managers only, i.e., excluding from the treatment any
foreign recruitment. If the origin of the managers does not matter, we will find an
improvement in competitiveness similar in size to baseline results.
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Table 12: A placebo test: TFP and British managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .007 .012 .010 .005 .010
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
R2 .968 .974 .975 .969 .975
No. of obs. 7381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment .005 .010 .008 .003 .009
(.015) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015)
R2 .967 .973 .974 .968 .974
No. of obs. 7,086 7,086 7,086 7,086 7,086
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment .048 -.069 -.069** .087 -.067
(.063) (.025) (.056) (.109) (.061)
R2 .992 .999 .993 .993 .999
No. of obs. 295 295 295 295 295
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes
Note: The table reports placebo estimates after treating firms with British managers. Foreign
managers are excluded and the control group is made by firms that never hired any foreign manager.
Coefficients are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level
controls include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, the share of managers on
employees and, for the first column, the foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
For our purpose, we run a separate propensity score matching with the same covari-
ates of Table 5, then we test Eq. (2). Our coefficients of interest in Table 12 are not
statistically significant, and we do not reject our previous findings.
In a third check, our concern is to exclude that our previous findings are exclusively
driven by higher mobility of managers within the same industry. In Appendix Table
A6, we specifically test the robustness of our results with placebo by treating firms only
with local managers that had a domestic experience, i.e., excluding from the treatment
any previous foreign positions. If what matters is just intra-industry mobility, be it
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at home or abroad, then we will find results similar to the baseline in Table 8. After
we randomize with a proper propensity score matching, diff-in-diff estimates show no
statistical significance from domestic industry experience in either domestic or foreign
companies. We detect an albeit weakly positive significant impact after the recruitment
of local managers with previous experience in a different industry. We do not reject
our baseline findings on the positive impact of prior industry experience by foreign
managers.
Finally, we report the results of a sensitivity check in the case of alternative firm-
level outcomes. For example, if firms had better access to foreign markets, we should
also observe an increase in total sales. On the other hand, if the productivity benefits
come from an already established (and unobserved) expansion plan, we should observe
in increase in either total employment or sales. In Appendix Tables A7, A8, and
A9, we test that neither firm size nor the average contribution of labor to production
are affected by the recruitment of first foreign managers. Firms do not employ more
workers, nor they sell more of their products after the recruits arrive. In this case, we
comment that higher TFP levels, as from baseline estimates, are more likely catching
changes in managerial practices and technological abilities in the broader sense since
the latter both can have a direct and ceteris-paribus impact on the efficient use of
production inputs.
6 Conclusion
As far as we know, no previous work has addressed the primary relationship between
foreign management and firm-level productivity. From our point of view, foreign man-
agers are highly skilled migrants that contribute to the transmission of knowledge across
national borders. Their role in the organization of a firm is peculiar, as they make a
combination of specific training experiences and soft skills. They transfer knowledge
acquired from previous positions to set the most suitable managerial practices that
allow other workers to make the best contribution to the mission of the company.
We find that domestic manufacturing firms largely benefit from hiring foreign man-
agers. We find that their Total Factor Productivity (TFP) increases in a range between
7% and 12% after recruiting first foreign managers. In general, recruiting highly-skilled
workers allows firms to have access to a broader pool of skills than the ones available
on the domestic market. In particular, in the case of managers, we find that previ-
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ous industry experience qualifies their contribution to the competitiveness of recruiting
companies.
Our identification strategy encompasses a propensity score matching technique, diff-
in-diff analyses, and the inclusion of pre-recruitment trends to challenge reverse causal-
ity. Moreover, our findings are robust to several robustness checks, including separate
placebo tests on British managers and national mobility, the adoption of different TFP
estimators, a switch to alternative firm-level outcomes.
Interestingly, we detect no significant gains by foreign-owned firms after they hire
first foreign managers. In this case, we argue, productivity spillovers could occur after
the acquisition by headquarters, when local subsidiaries become part of a multinational
enterprise, and they start aligning their managerial practices. More in general, our
findings suggest that there is no statistical difference in productivity between domestic
firms with foreign managers and foreign-owned firms with or without foreign managers.
Eventually, we support the idea that the international composition of the work-
force is a dimension that deserves more attention from scholars that study the global
outreach of modern firms. From this perspective, we argue that upcoming barriers to
the circulation of highly skilled workers, including managerial talents, as a consequence
of the Brexit event or as a response to the latest pandemic crisis, could hamper the
competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries.
References
Abadie, A., Imbens, G. W., 2006. Large sample properties of matching estimators for
average treatment effects. Econometrica 74 (1), 235–267.
Ackerberg, D. A., Caves, K., Frazer, G., 2015. Identification properties of recent pro-
duction function estimators. Econometrica 83 (6), 2411–2451.
Alviarez, V., Cravino, J., Levchenko, A. A., 2017. The growth of multinational firms in
the Great Recession. Journal of Monetary Economics 85 (C), 50–64.
Arnold, J. M., Javorcik, B. S., 2009. Gifted kids or pushy parents? foreign direct
investment and plant productivity in indonesia. Journal of International Economics
79 (1), 42 – 53.
Bahar, D., Rapoport, H., 2018. Migration, knowledge diffusion and the comparative
advantage of nations. The Economic Journal 128 (612), F273–F305.
Baldwin, R., 2016. The Great Convergence. Harvard University Press.
27
Baldwin, R., 2019. The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, Robotics, and the Future
of Work. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Beerli, A., Ruffner, J., Siegenthaler, M., Peri, G., November 2018. The abolition of
immigration restrictions and the performance of firms and workers: Evidence from
switzerland. Working Paper 25302, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J., Schott, P. K., 2018. Global firms. Journal
of Economic Literature 56 (2), 565–619.
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., 2003. Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm
Policies*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4), 1169–1208.
Bircan, C., 2019. Ownership structure and productivity of multinationals. Journal of
International Economics 116, 125 – 143.
Bloom, N., Brynjolfsson, E., Foster, L., Jarmin, R., Patnaik, M., Saporta-Eksten, I.,
Van Reenen, J., 2019. What drives differences in management practices? American
Economic Review 109 (5), 1648–83.
Bloom, N., Eifert, B., Mahajan, A., McKenzie, D., Roberts, J., 2012. Does Management
Matter? Evidence from India *. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1), 1–51.
Bloom, N., Lemos, R., Sadun, R., Scur, D., Van Reenen, J., 2014. JEEA-FBBVA Lec-
ture 2013: The New Empirical Economics of Management. Journal of the European
Economic Association 12 (4), 835–876.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., Van Reenen, J., 2016. Management as a technology? Working
Paper 22327, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., 2007. Measuring and Explaining Management Practices
Across Firms and Countries*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (4), 1351–
1408.
Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., 2010. Why do management practices differ across firms and
countries? Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (1), 203–24.
Bruhn, M., Karlan, D., Schoar, A., 2018. The impact of consulting services on small
and medium enterprises: Evidence from a randomized trial in mexico. Journal of
Political Economy 126 (2), 635 – 687.
Burzynski, M., Deuster, C., Docquier, F., 2020. Geography of skills and global inequal-
ity. Journal of Development Economics 142 (C).
Cappariello, R., Franco-Bedoya, S., Gunnella, V., Ottaviano, G., 2020. Matching in
cities. Working Paper CEPDP1682, Center for Economic Performance.
Cho, J., 2018. Knowledge transfer to foreign affiliates of multinationals through expa-
28
triation. Journal of International Economics 113, 106 – 117.
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., Gobillon, L., Puga, D., Roux, S., 2012. The produc-
tivity advantages of large cities: Distinguishing agglomeration from firm selection.
Econometrica 80 (6), 2543–2594.
Conconi, P., Sapir, A., Zanardi, M., 2016. The internationalization process of firms:
From exports to fdi. Journal of International Economics 99, 16 – 30.
Cravino, J., Levchenko, A. A., 2016. Multinational Firms and International Business
Cycle Transmission*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2), 921–962.
Dauth, W., Findeisen, S., Moretti, E., Suedekum, J., November 2018. Matching in
cities. Working Paper 25227, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Del Prete, D., Rungi, A., 2017. Organizing the global value chain: A firm-level test.
Journal of International Economics 109, 16 – 30.
Dhingra, S., Huang, H., Ottaviano, G., Paulo Pessoa, J., Sampson, T., Van Reenen,
J., 2017. The costs and benefits of leaving the EU: trade effects. Economic Policy
32 (92), 651–705.
di Giovanni, J., Levchenko, A. A., Ortega, F., 2015. A Global View of Cross-Border
Migration. Journal of the European Economic Association 13 (1), 168–202.
Fadinger, H., Mayr, K., 2014. Skill-Biased Technological Change, Unemployment, and
Brain Drain. Journal of the European Economic Association 12 (2), 397–431.
Giannetti, M., Liao, G., Yu, X., 2015. The brain gain of corporate boards: Evidence
from china. The Journal of Finance 70 (4), 1629–1682.
Giorcelli, M., January 2019. The long-term effects of management and technology trans-
fers. American Economic Review 109 (1), 121–52.
Golob-Sustersic, T., Zajc-Kejzar, K., 2020. The role of skilled migrant workers in fdi-
related technology transfer. Review of World Economics 156 (4), 103–132.
Gould, D., 1994. Immigrant links to the home country: Empirical implications for u.s.
bilateral trade flows. The Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (2), 302–16.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J., Yeaple, S. R., 2004. Export versus fdi with heterogeneous
firms. American Economic Review 94 (1), 300–316.
ILO, 2018. Global estimates on migrant workers: Results and methodology. Report,
International Labor Organization.
Imbens, G., Abadie, A., Drukker, D., Herr, J., 2004. Implementing matching estimators
for average treatment effects in stata. The STATA Journal 4 (3), 290–311.
Javorcik, B., Poelhekke, S., 2017. Former Foreign Affiliates: Cast Out and Outper-
29
formed? Journal of the European Economic Association 15 (3), 501–539.
Levinsohn, J., Petrin, A., 2003. Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Con-
trol for Unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies 70 (2), 317–341.
Markusen, J. R., Trofimenko, N., 2009. Teaching locals new tricks: Foreign experts as
a channel of knowledge transfers. Journal of Development Economics 88 (1), 120 –
131.
Meinen, P., Parrotta, P., Sala, D., Yalcin, E., 2018. Managers as Knowledge Carri-
ers - Explaining Firms’ Internationalization Success with Manager Mobility. Cesifo
working paper series, CESifo Group Munich.
Melitz, M. J., 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica 71 (6), 1695–1725.
Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market Size, Trade, and Productivity. The
Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295–316.
Mion, G., Opromolla, L. D., 2014. Managers’ mobility, trade performance, and wages.
Journal of International Economics 94 (1), 85 – 101.
Mion, G., Opromolla, L. D., Sforza, A., 2016. The Diffusion of Knowledge via Managers’
Mobility. CESifo Working Paper Series 6256, CESifo Group Munich.
Mitaritonna, C., Orefice, G., Peri, G., 2017. Immigrants and firms’ outcomes: Evidence
from France. European Economic Review 96 (C), 62–82.
Nathan, M., 2014. The wider economic impacts of high-skilled migrants: a survey of
the literature for receiving countries. IZA Journal of Migration 3 (4).
OECD, 2005. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Organization for the
Economic Co-operation and Development.
O’Neill, S., 2008. 4,000 company directors listed as global terror suspects and fraudsters.
news article on The Times, February 21, 2008.
ONS, 2019. Labor Market Overview: May 2019. Report, Office for National Statistics.
Orefice, G., Peri, G., 2020. Immigration and worker-firm matching. Working Paper
26860, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ortiz Valverde, G., Latorre, M. C., 2020. A computable general equilibrium analysis of
brexit: Barriers to trade and immigration restrictions. The World Economy 43 (3),
705–728.
Ottaviano, G. I., Peri, G., Wright, G. C., 2018. Immigration, trade and productivity
in services: Evidence from U.K. firms. Journal of International Economics 112 (C),
88–108.
30
Parrotta, P., Pozzoli, D., Pytlikova, M., 2014. Labor diversity and firm productivity.
European Economic Review 66 (C), 144–179.
Parsons, C., Vézina, P.-L., 2018. Migrant networks and trade: The vietnamese boat
people as a natural experiment. The Economic Journal 128 (612), F210–F234.
Rosenbaum, P. R., Rubin, D. B., 1983. The central role of the propensity score in
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70 (1), 41–55.
Rosenbaum, P. R., Rubin, D. B., 1985. Constructing a control group using multivariate
matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American
Statistician 39 (1), 33–38.
Rubin, D. B., 2001. Using propensity scores to help design observational studies: Appli-
cation to the tobacco litigation. Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology
2 (3), 169–188.
Santacreu-Vasut, E., Teshima, K., 2016. Foreign employees as channel for technology
transfer: Evidence from mnc’s subsidiaries in mexico. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 122, 92 – 112.
Syverson, C., 2011. What determines productivity? Journal of Economic Literature
49 (2), 326–65.
UNCTAD, 2009. UNCTAD Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operation
of TNCs - Volume I: FDI Flows and Stocks. United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development.
UNCTAD, 2016. World investment report 2016. Investor Nationality: Policy Chal-
lenges. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Walker, F. A., 1887. The Source of Business Profits. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 1 (3), 265–288.
Wooldridge, J. M., 2009. On estimating firm-level production functions using proxy
variables to control for unobservables. Economics Letters 104 (3), 112 – 114.
31
Appendix: Tables and Graphs
Table A1: Board, committee or department in which managers’ belong
Title No. of managers-per -role
Senior management 113,906
Board of Directors 99,163
Operations & Production & Manufacturing 11,322
Sales & Retail 8,923
Finance & Accounting 6,458
Administration department 4,885
Human Resources (HR) 4,008
Information Technology (IT) & Information Systems (IS) 3,367
Purchasing & Procurement 3,261
Research & Development / Engineering 3,091
Marketing & Advertising 2,816
Health & Safety 680
Branch Office 271
Legal/Compliance department 128
Product/Project/Market Management 126
Executive Committee 119
Audit Committee 61
Nomination Committee 58
Remuneration/Compensation Committee 53
Corporate Governance Committee 35
Supervisory Board 17
Risk Committee 11
Safety Committee 7
Executive Board 5
Environment Committee 4
Public & Government Affairs 4
Quality Assurance 4
Ethics Committee 3
Others & Unspecified 18,811
Note: The table reports roles of managers as present from our sample. Any manager can cover
more than one role in the same company, or she can participate to the management of more than
one company at the same time. We exclude from original sources only shareholders and advisors
without any role in the daily management of the firm. Please note how names of roles are not
standard across firms, as they may follow the specific responsibilities attributed to individuals
autonomously within firms.
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Table A2: Top 10 origin countries of foreign-owned firms
Nationality No. of companies
United States 1,321
Germany 394
Japan 279
France 262
Sweden 183
Switzerland 157
Ireland 155
Netherlands 146
Italy 105
Luxembourg 96
Others 1,052
Note: We define a foreign-owned firm following international standards ((OECD, 2005; UNCTAD,
2009; UNCTAD, 2016), according to which a subsidiary is controlled after a (direct or indirect)
concentration of voting rights (> 50%).
Table A3: T-tests on TFP distributions for firms with and without foreign managers
Average value of TFP With Without With Without Total
foreign managers foreign managers new foreign managers new foreign managers
All firms 2.638*** 2.468*** 2.658*** 2.516*** 2.528
(0.013) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008) (0.008)
Domestic firms 2.656*** 2.432*** 2.607** 2.455** 2.458
(0.027) (0.010) (0.068) (0.009) (0.009)
Foreign subsidiaries 2.634 2.670 2.667 2.637 2.643
(0.015) (0.025) (0.031) (0.014) (0.013)
Note: Columns (2) and (3) show the TFP averages of firms with and without foreign managers,
respectively. Columns (4) and (5) show the TFP averages of firms with and without new foreign
recruits in 2009-2017. The last column pools all firms together. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
We test the null hypotheses that averages are equal after a t-test. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table A4: TFP and US Managers
All Domestic Foreign
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: US passports
Hired US× Post .023 .026 .014
(.043) (.080) (.051)
Hired non-US× Post .045* .084** -.050**
(.024) (.038) (.019)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Panel B: US passports and US experience
Hired US× US Experience× Post .012 -.007 -.010
(.080) (.062) (.098)
Hired US× No US Experience× Post .026 .032 .022
(.042) (.090) (.043)
Hired non-US× Post .045* .084** -.050**
(.024) (.038) (.019)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel A reports estimates of Eq. (2) on the matched sample when Hired× Post is split by
companies that recruited a manager from the US or not. In Panel B the dummy Hired US×Post
is split by companies recruiting US managers with experience within US or not. Coefficients are
in log units. Errors in parentheses are clustered by 2-digit industries. Firm-level controls include
age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment density
and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p <
0.01, respectively.
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Table A5: TFP and managers from Commonwealth countries
All Domestic Foreign
Panel A: Commonwealth managers
Hired CW× Post .053 .095 -.043
(.044) (.059) (.052)
Hired non-CW× Post .034 .067 -.021
(.023) (.044) (.025)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Panel B: Commonwealth managers and Commonwealth experience
Hired CW× CW Experience× Post .001 .424 -.086
(.067) (.248) (.077)
Hired CW× No CW Experience× Post .089** .045 .009
(.042) (.062) (.052)
Hired non-CW× Post .034 .067 -.021
(.023) (.045) (.025)
R2 .951 .952 .967
No. of obs. 5,663 2,720 2,943
Panels A and B:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
4-digit Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel A reports estimates of Eq. (2) on the matched sample when Hired × Post is split
by companies that recruited a manager from a country of the Commonwealth or not. In Panel B
the dummy Hired CW× Post is split by companies recruiting managers with experience within a
Commonwealth country or not. Coefficients are in log units. Errors in parentheses are clustered
by 2-digit industries. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage
bill, skill intensity, regional employment density and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, **
and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table A6: A placebo test: TFP and domestic experience
Dep. variable: (log) TFP All Domestic Foreign
Domestic Experience× Same Industry× Post -.013 -.013 -.048
(.021) (.021) (.098)
Domestic Experience×Other Industry× Post .042* .043* .004
(.024) (.023) (.051)
No Experience× Post .014 .013 -.020
(.017) (.017) (.015)
R2 .976 .976 .999
No. of obs. 6,598 6,343 255
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports placebo estimates after treating firms with British managers with national
experience. We exclude any manager with any foreign experience, whereas the control group is
made by firms that never hired any foreign manager. Coefficients are in log units. Errors are
clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital
intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment density and, for the first column,
the foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table A7: Labour productivity, foreign managers, and industry experience
Dep. variable: (log) Labour Productivity All Domestic Foreign
Panel A
Hired× Post .055* .030 -.018
(.029) (.042) (.044)
R2 .494 .602 .581
No. of obs. 5,720 2,750 2,970
Panel B
Foreign Experience× Same Industry× Post .030 -.091 .007
(.054) (.103) (.067)
Foreign Experience×Other Industry× Post .085 .141 -.025
(.073) (.091) (.065)
No Foreign Experience× Post .056 .036 -.056
(.034) (.057) (.079)
R2 .494 .604 .582
No. of obs. 5,720 2,750 2,970
Panels A and B:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates on the (log of) labor productivity estimates as sales per employee.
Coefficients are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level
controls include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional
employment density and, for the first column, the foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand
for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table A8: Employees, foreign managers, and industry experience
Dep. variable: (log) Employment All Domestic Foreign
Panel A
Hired× Post .046 .023 .037
(.029) (.048) (040)
R2 .722 .790 .737
No. of obs. 5,735 2,758 2,977
Panel B
Foreign Experience× Same Industry× Post .043 -.022 .031
(.051) (.066) (.065)
Foreign Experience×Other Industry× Post .084 .130 .004
(.050) (.113) (.065)
No Foreign Experience× Post .022 -.001 .097*
(.060) (.074) (.053)
R2 .723 .790 .737
No. of obs. 5,735 2,758 2,977
Panels A and B:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Regon effects 0.9 Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates on (log of) firm-level number of employees as a proxy of firm
size. Coefficients are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-
level controls include age, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment
density and, for the first column, the foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p
< 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table A9: Sales, foreign managers, and industry experience
Dep. variable: (log) Sales All Domestic Foreign
Panel A: Foreign experience
Hired× Post .101** .056 .019
(.038) (.083) (.069)
R2 .636 .736 .637
No. of obs. 5,720 2,750 2,970
Panel B
Foreign Experience× Same Industry× Post .076 -.115 .040
(.074) (.149) (.099)
Foreign Experience×Other Industry× Post .166 .272* -.020
(.100) (.143) (.105)
No Foreign Experience× Post .077 .040 .036
(.070) (.119) (.075)
R2 .636 .738 .637
No. of obs. 5,720 2,750 2,970
Panels A and B:
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry & age & size trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports estimates on (log of) firm-level sales as a proxy of firm size. Coefficients
are in log units. Errors are clustered by 2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level controls
include age, employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, regional employment
density and, for the first column, the foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p
< 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Figure A1: Regional coverage of foreign and domestic managers after matching
Note: Each point of the scatter plot represents the number of British (graph on the left) or foreign
(graph on the right) managers in one NUTS 2-level region in the matched sample (on the x-axis)
compared with the entire sample (on the y-axis). Correlations in the two graphs are 0.927 and
0.929, respectively.
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